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This essay will examine the multi-dimensional dynamics of global labor migrations participating in and
facilitated by globalization, by analyzing Japan's contemporary experience of rapidly intensified foreign
labor immigration. Japan has not considered itself as a country of immigration until recently. Since
Japan's prewar self-modernization period, conservative political discourse has conceptualized the
modern nation-state as a racially homogeneous entity. This discourse established the cultural and
political foundation for Japanese identity, and Japan's relationship with the outside world. Consequently,
the incorporation of culturally and ethnically different Others has been deemed a threat to the harmony of
Japan's homogeneous society. Yet, beginning in the late 1980s when the term internationalization began
to be widely used in Japan as a political slogan for the rapid expansion of the Japanese economy the
number of foreign workers legally and illegally entering into Japan has increased remarkably, and these
workers have become deeply incorporated in its society. The traditional migration theory utilizes
neoclassical economic view in regarding labour migration as voluntary movement. This tradition
considers that individuals choose to migrate through a calculation of the cost-and-benefits. However, the
ahistorical and individualistic perspective of this model cannot precisely explain the historically changing
modes of labour migrations. In this respect, through the critical lens of international political economy,
this study will explore the contested relationship between foreign labor migration and the modern nationstate by applying three conceptual tools within Robert Cox's analytical framework, which are: the
internationalization of production; the internationalization of state; and the reconstitution of power
relations among diversified social forces. This essay will argue that increasing inflows and incorporation
of the Others have posed a serious challenge to Japan's socially constructed hegemonic and mythical
self-perception as a homogeneous nation-state and society. It will suggest democratization at the social
and institutional levels as the consequent need for Japan within the context of globalization.
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The problem of foreign labor is
primarily the process of choosing the future citizens.
With the increasing liberalization of contemporary economic activities,
the coexistence with foreigners is a definitive path.
Fundamentally, a social acceptance as it ought to be is needed to be
transformed at the grass-root level.

Tadashi Hanami and Yasuo Kuwabara
Asu no Rinjin: Gaikokujin Rodosha
[Tomorrow’s Neighbors: Foreign Workers]
Emphasis in original
Translation by author
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The Myth of Homogeneity and the “Others”:
Foreign Labor Migration and Globalization in the Case of Japan
I. Introduction
Throughout the evolution of global capitalist economy, trans-border labor migrations and
the modern nation-states have been paradoxically related across time and space.

Global labor

migration is not a historical novelty, but their forms and trends have shifted through changing global
configurations of power and production.

As the contemporary “great transformation”1 of the

world order has dramatically reconstituted the multidimensional aspects of human activity,
significant changes have occurred in the pattern of the global labor flows.

Revolutionary

developments in transportation and communication technology, which have reduced the costs and
enlarged the spatial range of movement, have dramatically increased the scope and speed of
international labor transfers.

Furthermore, the current conspicuousness of South-to-North and

East-to-West migratory flows marks a distinct shift from the North-to-South pattern characteristic of
the nineteenth century.

Reflecting this intensification of labor inflows to the highly industrialized

countries, politicians and policy makers in these host countries have paid keen attention to the issue
of how to control foreign workers’ entries by assessing their economic value, and their social and
political costs.

By exploring the historically contested relationship between foreign workers and

the notion of the modern nation-state in the world capitalist economy through the lens of critical
International Political Economy (IPE), this essay attempts to scrutinize the economic, political,
social and cultural dynamics of global labor migrations participating in and facilitated by
contemporary globalization.
The contested nature of migratory flows is clearly exemplified by Japan, which has never
considered itself as a country of immigration until recently.

Since Japan’s self-modernization

project in the prewar period, conservative political discourse has conceptualized the modern
nation-state as a racially homogeneous entity.

This concept established the cultural and political
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foundation for both Japanese identity and the country’s relationship with the outside world.
Consequently, the incorporation of culturally and ethnically different “Others” has been deemed a
serious threat to the harmony of the homogeneous Japanese society, and Japanese insecurity has
been translated into the state’s restrictive immigration regulations.2 Yet, Japan has not proven
exempt from receiving an influx of foreign workers, as the world becomes increasingly globalized.
Beginning in the late 1980s—when the term “internationalization” was widely, but vaguely, used as
a dominant political slogan along with the rapid expansion of the Japanese economy3—the number
of foreign workers legally and illegally flowing into Japan increased remarkably, accompanied by
heated debates as to whether Japan should embrace this new segment of the population.

More

importantly, even after the Japanese economy fell into recession following the burst of the “bubble”
economy, the number of immigrant workers in Japan has not decreased noticeably, but these
workers have become more deeply incorporated in Japanese society as “long-term stayers” or
“social beings.” Approximately 1.8 million foreigners legally or illegally live in Japanese society.4
This essay will endeavor to holistically capture Japan’s problem of foreign labor migration
in the context of globalization within the framework of critical IPE, by analyzing the dialectical
interactions between rapidly intensified flows of migrant workers into Japan and the restructuring in
the mode of production, forms of state and configurations of power relations among various social
forces.

Through exploring the multidimensional impacts of these labor migrations on Japanese

society, this essay will argue that increasing inflows and incorporation of the “Others” have
challenged Japan to reconsider the persuasive notion of the modern Japanese nation-state as a
culturally and ethnically homogeneous community founded upon the ongoing “social construction
of reality”5 through its modernization.

It will further argue that the challenge posed by foreign

labor migration has raised the question of the true meaning of Japan’s “internationalization” within
the context of contemporary globalization.
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To systematize this analysis, the essay is divided into two parts.

The first part will

contextualize the dynamics of global labor migration by reviewing the arguments of critical IPE
scholars.

In this section, through examining the traditional neoclassical explanatory model of

migration and its critiques from the IPE perspective, the theoretical framework of this essay will be
formulated.

Viewed through the lens of critical IPE, the second part of the essay will explore the

complex and multifaceted issue of foreign labor migrations in Japan in the contemporary
globalization period.

II. Theoretical Framework
A. Neoclassical Explanatory Model and its Critics
Various specialized disciplines of social science have developed different approaches to the
study of international labor migration.6 Among them, the traditionally predominant explanatory
theory of migration, launched by the geographer E.G. Ravenstein in the 1880s,7 regards labor
migrations as voluntary individual movement resulting from migrants’ calculation of the
cost-benefits under the conditions of unevenly distributed economic opportunities, based on the
neoclassical economic notion of human beings as rational actors in maximizing their economic
utility.

This approach is also known as “push-pull” theory owing to its search for the causes of

migration in the variables combining “push factors” (e.g., low living standards, lack of economic
opportunities, rapid demographic growth) and “pull factors” (e.g., demand for labor, availability of
land, good economic opportunities).8 In other words, the neoclassical view emphasizes the
existence of socioeconomic disparities between the sending and receiving countries as a sufficient
explanatory variable promoting labor migration.

Furthermore, in this model, originated in the

neoclassical concept of the self-regulating market mechanism, such labor flows—together with
other economic exchanges—are viewed as a way of restoring economic equilibrium between spatial
units.9 The successful advancement of capitalist market-economy improving wages and economic
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conditions in the developing countries is considered a constraint on the escalating labor
immigrations into highly developed countries.

Yet, by reconsidering this individualistic and

ahistorical theoretical discourse from an international and interdisciplinary viewpoint, critical IPE
theorists have revealed its oversimplification and inability to comprehend actual migration patterns
or predict future ones.
First, critical IPE scholars point out the neoclassical migration model’s lack of
multidimensionality.

Aristide R. Zolberg posits that neoclassical migration theory does not make

the fundamental distinction between domestic and transnational movements by ignoring the political
dimension constituent of all international migrations.10 Indeed, Silvano M. Tomasi notes that labor
migrants have “incorporated into a stratification system that reflected discrimination based on the
cultural distance of newcomers from the dominant group and on the industrial function they were
expected to carry out in an expanding economy.”11 That is, the traditional migration theory
precludes paying due attention to the diverse paths followed by migrant minorities by viewing them
as a mere labor-force in economic terms.

IPE critics stress that not only economic, but also

political and cultural dimensions must be scrutinized to fully understand the dynamics of the
international labor migration flows.
Furthermore, critical IPE theorists contend that the simplistic list of “push-pull” variables
from the ahistorical and individualistic perspective in the traditional model render it incapable of
sufficiently capturing not only the historically altering modes of labor migrations—ranging from
coerced labor extraction (slavery) beginning in the sixteenth century to the present self-initiated
international labor flow—but also the uneven development of labor migrations across time and
space.12 From the IPE perspective, referring to the Polanyian concept of “embeddedness” that
articulates the insertion of economic transactions of the most diverse sorts in the overarching social
structure, Alejandro Portes also argues that “decisions to migrate do not occur in a vacuum; the
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‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ that enter into such individual calculations are themselves conditioned by an
institutional structure reflecting external hegemony.”13 Through emphasizing the importance of “the
historicization of migration theory,”14 and devoting due attention to the changing specificities of
time and space, the critical IPE approach views international labor migration not as a voluntarily
individual movement, but rather as movement based on social networks linking various countries,
which both shapes and is a consequence of a restructuring of the global political economy.15 This
viewpoint is encapsulated by the Marxian perception that “men make history…but not in conditions
of their own choosing.”16 In this respect, critical IPE theory clarifies the structural implications of
the constitution of the world order, driven by the consolidation of capitalism as the international
economic system and the enhancement of the nation-state as the key political actor, over the
historical evolution of international labor migration.
In historical terms, the rapid expansion of capitalism under imperialism and the subsequent
consolidation of capitalist order as the basis of global economy resulted in the disintegration or
subordination of non-capitalist forms of subsistence.

The transformation of land into a commodity

led to the emergence of a mass of landless peasants left little alternative but to be absorbed into the
rural or urban labor reserve.

In this respect, the process of peripheralization was marked by the

constitution of a very large mass of surplus labor within the newly established labor market in these
regions.

Due to escalating urbanization and a lack of diversification within the productive sectors

in the periphery, members of this labor surplus were destined to compete for scarce employment.
This condition eventually facilitated the formation of a pool of potential emigrants.

Accordingly,

the consolidation of a global capitalist economy through the subordination of large areas of the
world as a “periphery” generated international labor migrations originating in less-developing
countries to satisfy the labor needs of the industrializing countries.17
Indeed, the critical IPE perspective sheds light on the strengthening of the nation-states as a
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basic political unit, coinciding with the consolidation of the world capitalist system, by emphasizing
the considerations of the concept of modern nation-state and its contradictory relation to the
displacement of labor as imperative in fully capturing the historically altered forms of trans-border
labor flows.18 The notion of the “modern nation-state” is a socially and historically constructed
reality.

Modern nation-state building was, as Nina Glick Schiller et al. elucidate, a political

process creating “a myth that each nation-state contained within it a single people defined by their
residence in a common territory, their undivided loyalty to a common government, and their shared
cultural heritage.”19 Inherent to modern nation-states is the combination of the “nation” as
cultural—e.g. ethnic or racial—homogeneous “imagined community”20 and the “state” as a
sovereign regime within a particular bounded territory.

Indeed, nation-states convey a sense of

identity and belonging, marking their memberships by defining “citizenship,” which, as R. Baubock
articulates, designates “the equality of rights of all citizens within political community, as well as a
corresponding set of institutions guaranteeing these rights.”21 For modern nation-states, therefore,
the arrival of large waves of immigrants speaking different languages, practicing different religions,
or simply having different habits, has challenged national consciousness among citizens rooted in
collective cultural ties and sentiments.

Grounded on continuing state regulations over the entry

and exit of labor since the late nineteenth century, Zolberg argues that it is the actions of state more
than individual migrants’ motivations and invidious comparisons between country of origin and
destination that account for the feasibility and characteristics of migration flows.22
Nevertheless, as indicated by Immanuel Wallerstein who argues that “capitalism as an
economic mode is based on the fact that the economic factor operates within an arena larger than
that which any political entity can fully control,”23 the capitalist world economy has consisted of a
multiplicity of the nation-states with no full control by a single political regime.

Encountering the

problem of labor scarcity, which has historically been crucial in enhancing the efficiency of capital
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accumulation under the conditions of rapid industrialization, nation-states have imported foreign
labor in various forms, depending on “a country’s place in the international division of labor and the
particular mode of specialization prevalent at a given time in the world system.”24 That is,
throughout historical capitalist expansion, foreign labor migrants have played an important, but
contradictory, role in providing nation-states’ own politically and economically suitable labor supply
system as a precondition for realizing the surplus-generating possibilities of a given geographic
location.

In other word, modern nation-states have inherently contained “conflicting interests—to

maximize the labor supply and to protect cultural integrity….”25 By recognizing international
migration as a key element in the production and reproduction of labor within capital accumulation
on the global scale, this dilemma of the modern nation-state is elucidated as one of the essential
issues in holistically exploring the complex and multifaceted nature of international labor flows with
the dramatic expansion and restructuring of global capitalist economy.
Within the context of contemporary globalization, the accelerating interconnectedness of
the global economy through the rising flows of capital and goods, which, in turn, have been
facilitated by technological developments in communication and transportation and by the growing
number and scale of trans-national institutions organizing production, distribution, and consumption,
has led to the great transformations of the global division of labor and power relations.26 As part of
the global changes of social practice, rapidly growing transnational labor flows in terms of their
extensity and intensity have connected economic, political and cultural activities that were
previously more or less divided.27 In this respect, as critical IPE scholars suggest, to holistically
explore the complex dynamism of contemporary globalization of labor migration, it is vital to
analyze these flows in the light of the dramatic restructuring of the global political economy.

By

scrutinizing the dialectical relations of contemporary global labor migration with the great
transformations of global political economy, the following examination will attempt to contextualize
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the dynamics of these labor displacements, especially escalating inflows of foreign workers into the
highly industrialized countries, within the context of contemporary globalization.

B. Globalization, Global Labor Migration and Critical IPE
Critical IPE theory deems contemporary global labor migration as shaped by and
facilitating the current restructuring of the global political economy based on a capitalist economic
order and a nation-state system, which has been broadly termed as “globalization.” Because
“globalization” is a much-contested notion, it is vital to briefly clarify the critical IPE conception of
the dynamics of globalization.

The “skeptics” thesis, represented by Paul Hirst and Graham

Thompson, defines globalization as the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural
transactions across borders with their emphasis on quantitative terms, invariably concluding that
there is nothing very new about globalization as a result of empiricist cross-time comparisons.28
However, to highlight the interdependence between the dynamics of contemporary globalization and
global labor migration, the quantified understanding of labor migratory flows not only undermines
their historically altering forms and implications but also, more importantly, ignores the question of
what causes these changes.
Going beyond quantitative terms, critical IPE scholars interpret globalization as
“qualitative practices operating in the global space.”29 Consequently, the concept of globalization is
elucidated through addressing three key factors: (1) the increasing interdependence or
interconnectedness of multidimensional and multilayered human activities; (2) the compression of
time and space; and (3) most importantly, the historically ongoing structural transformation in the
economic, political, and cultural realms, which may produce either accommodation or resistance.30
Along the same lines, citing Anthony Giddens, Lily Kong points out the contingent nature of
globalization by arguing that it is not an ‘out there’ phenomenon but rather an “in here”
phenomenon transforming the very texture of everyday life and affecting even the intimacies of
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personal identity.31 That is, the critical IPE conceptualization of globalization designates the
continuing qualitative reconfiguration of the world structure by recognizing its “subjective” and
“objective” implications.

This understanding allows critical IPE analysis to underline the

economical, political and cultural dimensions of global labor migration within the context of
contemporary globalization by precisely capturing the dialectic relationship of these two processes.
To scrutinize the dynamic changes in the structure of contemporary global political economy and
the concomitant reconstitution of power relations, Robert W. Cox suggests an analytical framework
from the critical IPE standpoint.
By reconstructing Gramscian historical materialism on a global scale,32 Cox’s critical
perspective overcomes the conventional international studies’ theoretical perception of the world as
an aggregation of state or regime relations by regarding the state/society complex as the basic entity
in international relations.33 For Cox, critical IPE constructs “a [large] picture of the whole of which
the initially contemplated part is just one component” and seeks “to understand the processes of
change in which both parts and whole are involved.”34 To achieve this purpose, Cox conceptualizes
the transformations of historical structures and power relations of the global political economy
through focusing on three spheres of human activity, whose conditions are most propitious for
change within the world system: (1) “the patterns of production organization,” with special attention
to the “social forces” produced through the production process; (2) “forms of state” as the
articulation of state/society complexes; and (3) “world order,” as the ensemble of power among
diversified social forces.

More importantly, the three levels are dialectically interrelated to create a

particular configuration of the world structure.35 In this respect, the following analysis attempts to
contextualize the dynamics of contemporary global labor migration by applying the three categories
of the Coxian framework.
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The Internationalization of Production and Global Labor Migration
To comprehend the context of “the age of transition”36 in the structure of the contemporary
global political economy, the Coxian approach focuses on shifts in the capitalist mode of production
to maximize capital accumulation.

As Cox notes, whereas the postwar international economy

connected national economies by focusing on exchange, the current world economy predominated
by neoliberal economic globalization has denationalized economic activities by focusing on
production.

For Cox, the distinctive restructuring of the capitalist world economy in contemporary

globalization is characterized by “the internationalization of production,” which denotes “the
integration of production processes on a transnational scale, with different phases of a single process
being carried out in different countries.”37 Facilitated by technological innovation—which has
always been “the servant of dominant capital”38—that not only intensifies global competition but
also transforms its spatial and temporal scales, the loci of production have territorially reorganized
on the transnational scale and expanded through foreign direct investment (FDI) to minimize overall
production costs by taking advantage of differences between the factor endowments of countries,
especially differences in labor costs.

Indeed, David Harvey considers this reconstitution of

production processes as the transition from the rigid Fordism to the geographically and temporally
flexible capital accumulation by enhancing flexibility in production, labor market, and
consumption.39 That is, the contemporary internationalizing mode of production has spatially
rearranged the traditional international division of labor at the global, more particularly regional,
level, leading to the formation of global assembly lines boosting flexible capital accumulation.
In this context, transnational production organizations through FDI from the highly
industrialized countries has been designated as new forms of the integration of the developing
countries in the global capitalist economy through intensifying labor emigrations from developing
countries, which, in turn, also contributes not only to the further restructuring of global economy but
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also to the formulation of the complex global division of labor.40 The “new industrialization” in the
developing countries promoted by FDI has changed pre-existent socio-economic organizations by
both introducing the capitalist modes of production and penetrating normative consumption
expectations imported from the advanced countries to the peripheral societies.

The construction of

labor-intensive production plants has incorporated new segments of the population into wage-labor
contracts associated with the destruction of the traditional means of livelihood.

In this regard, the

increasing feminization of the new proletariats due to the recruitment preference of foreign plants
for young women (regarded as more pliant and less costly) has imposed an additional disruptive
impact on traditional employment structure in the developing regions as well as their production and
reproduction processes, contributing to male unemployment and, in some cases, to male
emigration.41 Furthermore, the phenomenon of “runaway factories”—indicating that employment
created through FDI by multinational corporations (MNCs) remains only as long as labor costs
remain comparatively low—has enlarged the pool of potential emigrants.42 As another noteworthy
impact of transnational production organizations on global labor migrations, FDI encourages the
movement of people, very often in the direction where investment capital originates.

Saskia

Sassen explains this trend by arguing that the significant levels and concentration of FDI have
consolidated objective and ideological links between workers in the developing world and the
highly industrialized countries, providing this capital through specific working situations wherein
workers find themselves producing goods and services demanded by highly developed countries.43
In sum, the escalating internationalization of production in more or less geographically uneven and
fragmented manners, due to the strategies of enterprises, has created structural conditions for
emigration as an optional solution to these multiple disruptions in highly patterned directions.
Yet, these reasons only partially capture the essence of the dialectical relation between the
reorganization of capitalist mode of production at the global scale and global labor migration.

W.R.
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Bohning argues that “there cannot be any emigration without immigration opportunities
elsewhere….”44 In this respect, Sassen has argued that the deindustrialization of highly
industrialized economies associated with the internationalization of production, particularly the
consolidation of “global cities,” has promoted the concentration of both high-level control and
management operations and a vast expansion of low-wage jobs constituted mainly by a rapidly
developing service industry and the downgraded manufacturing sectors.45 Furthermore, the
permeation of the conceptualized “socially undesirable jobs”46 within the ingrained job hierarchies
and the increasing rigidity of labor market facilitated by the demographic changes, such as the aging
of the population, have generated the structural shortage of low-wage labor in the advanced
industrialized countries.47 In this context, the significant vacuum in the lower segment of the labor
market has provided employment opportunities for immigrant workers.

Consequently, their

massive inflows as flexible and disposable cheap labor-sources in the developed countries have not
only reconstituted the geographically conceptualized core-periphery but also reinforced the further
restructuring of the global economy by destabilizing the exclusive territoriality of the modern
nation-states.
That is, the contemporary intensification of labor inflows into the highly industrialized
countries has been conditioned by two changing processes of global economy—the rapid
internationalization of the production with a notable growth in FDI and the deindustrialization of
core countries which has led to their structural scarcity of low-wage labor.

Indeed, following Max

Frisch’s aphorism, “we imported labor, we got people,” Zolberg notes that:
Considered over the longer term…a remarkable feature of the migrant labor
pattern is its instability in the sense that the unidimensionality on which it is
founded cannot be maintained for very long. Sooner or later, any foreign worker
comes to be conceived of not only as an economic actor, but also as a cultural,
social or political actor…and hence as a potential member of the society.”48
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In this respect, within the context of increasing economic globalization, the political and cultural
implications of global labor migration, as part of the restructuring of global political economy at
large, need to be clarified to underline the challenge of these labor displacements toward the modern
nation-state by analyzing the restructuring in the form of state and in the power configurations
among various social forces within the context of contemporary globalization.

The Internationalization of State and the Deterritorializing of the Nation-state
Reflecting the increasingly interconnected world with the acceleration of neoliberal
economic globalization, the question of whether the nation-state still matters has generated
controversy among scholars, ranging from some positing the imminent end of the nation-state to
others considering the state as one of the main “authors” of globalization.49 With this debate in
mind, Cox articulates the qualitatively changing role of the state by using the concept of “the
internationalization of the state.” This refers to “the global process whereby national policies and
practices have been adjusted to the exigencies of the world economy of international production.”50
In other words, as the economic and social relations of production are progressively more
dominated by transnational processes, so must the function of the state coping with those processes
increasingly be performed transnationally to be effective.

Indeed, along with the internationalizing

of the state, the restructuring of the state in the contemporary globalization period, in contrast to
welfare nationalist states of the preceding period concentrated on economic planning at the national
level, has promoted the practice of economic policy harmonization regarding the needs or
requirements of the global economy within a neoliberal ideological framework.
Within the context of the rapid economic globalization, the growing convergence of
immigration policies in the highly industrialized nation-states can also be underlined despite the
differences stemming from their specifics of culture and history.51 More strikingly, the
harmonization of immigration policies in developed countries contains crucial contradictions, which
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the Coxian concept of the “internationalizing of state” does not address: the liberal market economy
is unequivocally illiberal when it comes to the free movement of labor.

That is, as compellingly

caught by Stephen Gill’s concept of “disciplinary neoliberalism,”52 the neoliberal restructuring of
the global economy involves the briskly escalating free movement of goods, services, and capital as
well as the disciplining of labor.

In this respect, considering the restrictive tendency of

host-country immigration policies and their implications for the actual inflows of labor is imperative
in holistically understanding the processes of global labor migration in terms of its dialectical
relations to the restructuring of state forms and, more particularly, their impact on the notion of the
modern nation-state.
Host states have adopted convergent restrictive immigration policies in terms of the
selective entries of foreign workers.53 Here, the highly industrialized countries of immigration have
consciously facilitated the entry of professionals and skilled workers as a response to the increasing
demand for these labors to sustain and maximize their competitiveness in the global economy, while
impeding massive inflows of semi- and unskilled labor.

These highly selective criteria can be

understood as the continuing dilemma inherent to the modern nation-states between employing
foreign laborers and sustaining historically constructed ideas of cultural unity.

Sassen perceives

this contradiction between neoliberal economic globalization and illiberal labor migration as the
interaction between “economic denationalizing and political renationalizing.”54 However, with the
rapidly aggravated shortages of low-wage labor in the highly developed countries through the
restructuring of global economy, the regulatory barriers in the host states reinforce the development
of irregular channels.

As Bimal Ghosh argues, host countries must deal with a direct trade-off that

can be envisaged between legal exclusion and illegal migration.55 More precisely, the
renationalizing of the state as a response to a severe low-wage labor shortage within the context of
dramatic economic globalization has escalated the tendency of migrants to use irregular channels to
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enter the countries of destination, developing the stratification between legal and illegal migrant
laborers.
Indeed, as legal and illegal laborers are massively displaced on a transnational scale, Arjun
Appadurai and other critical IPE scholars emphasize the contemporary world as “deterritorialized”
through various forms of “reterritorialization.”56 Since all modern ideologies of rights depend,
ultimately, on the “closed” (enumerated, stable, and immobile) group of appropriate recipients of
state protection and patronage, the transfers of foreign labor into new polities require
reterritorialization within a new civic order, whose ideology of ethnic coherence and citizenship
rights they are bound to disturb.

From this perspective, as the current globalized flows of laborers

have made the concept of national culture and identity highly questionable, the nation-state, or more
precisely, the relationship between “nation” and “state” has entered into crisis, with the modern
notion of territorial sovereignty as the crucial problem.

Appadurai notes that escalating ethnic

pluralities expose and intensify “the gap between the powers of the state to regulate borders,
monitor dissent, distribute entitlements within a finite territory and the fiction of ethnic singularity
on which most nations ultimately rely.”57 In sum, the growing displacements of labor at the
transnational scale have created disparities between the notion of modern nation-state and the
deterritorialization of contemporary nation-states as well as economic activities.
Thus, the development of economic globalization and the rapid escalation of migrant flows
even under restrictive host-country immigration policies have facilitated the restructuring of the
state/society complex by elucidating not only the internationalization of state but also its
deterritorialization through the reterritorializing processes.

In other words, contemporary global

labor migration has made the notion of modern nation-states highly questionable and, more
precisely, exposed the disparities between the increasingly multicultural characteristics of society
and the concept of culturally and ideologically coherent nation.

Indeed, as the de facto conversion

17

of workforce migration into settlement migration has become increasingly apparent among foreign
laborers (reflecting the structurally-generated labor shortage in the advanced industrialized
countries), these contradictory conditions stemming from the trends of economic denationalizing
and political renationalizing have created potential and/or realized conflicts in these societies.

In

this respect, it is crucial to articulate the dialectical relationship between the restructuring in power
relations among social forces and global labor migrations, focusing on the emergence of new social
forces in the politics of immigration.

New Social Forces, Multiculturalism, and the Politics of Migration
Regarding “power” as emerging from social processes rather than accumulated material
capabilities, Cox claims that the restructuring of global economy and the concomitant
reorganization of the global division of labor may be mobilizing social forces associated with the
consequent reshaping of power relations.58 From Cox’s perspective, social forces created through
the changing processes of social and economic relations with the globalizing capitalist mode of
production are the essential starting points for considering a possible future.

More strikingly, Cox

argues that tendencies towards organizing global production and internationalizing the state are
never complete; the more these restructurings advance, the more they have the potential to incite
social groups that have been disadvantaged or excluded in the new domestic realignments to sustain
countermovements.59 Examination of the racialization within the incorporating mechanism for
foreign laborers and the consequent emergence of “new” social forces not only precisely articulates
the Coxian perception of countertendencies inherent to globalization, but also explores how the
dynamics of global labor migration dialectically relate to the power configuration among various
social forces by addressing the increasing complexity in the politics of migration.
As indicated by the shift of immigrants from some temporary laborers to permanent settlers
through the restructuring and deindustrialization of the advanced economies and the state’s failure to
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keep illegal foreign workers out, the social inclusion of these “Others” has engendered an
“unavoidable challenge”60 for host countries.

In this context, as Stephen Castles and Mark J.

Miller argue, the integration of culturally diverse immigrants presents the modern nation-states with
a dilemma rooted in the intimate relationship between cultural belonging and political identity:
“incorporation of the newcomers as citizens may undermine myths of cultural homogeneity; but
failure to incorporate them may lead to divided societies, marked by severe inequality and
conflict.”61 While encountering this dilemma, the contemporary re-emphasis on ethnoterritorial
thinking in the cultural ideologies of the “developed” nations has led to social segmentation based
on ethno-cultural differences, making second-classness and third-classness conditions for the
integration of migrants, however plural the ethnic ideology of the host nation-state.62 This
discriminatory behavior can be deemed as the “racialization (or ethnicization) of immigrant
minorities” to promote a public discourse implying that a range of social or political problems are a
“natural” consequence of certain ascribed cultural characteristics of minorities regarded as
primordial, static and regressive by the dominant groups.63 In fact, as Castles and others have
indicated, migrant workers can be manipulated not only by their precarious legal status in the host
country, but also by a process of racialization stemming from racial violence, residential segregation,
economic disadvantage and social exclusion.64 In short, the pervasive practices of racial
discrimination within the sphere of civil society and in state immigration policymaking have
marginalized or excluded labor migrants, leading to potential or actual conflict.
As a response to the racialization of immigrant workers, “new” social forces have been
mobilized in the domestic as well as transnational realms.

Sassen has considered the proliferation

of political actors as “new” social forces supported by the lobbying of international human rights
and other migration interest groups, suggesting that “the overall effect of these developments is to
constrain the sovereignty of the state and to undermine old notions about immigration control.”65

19

Among the various social forces influencing the politics of migration, the resistance movements of
immigrant communities play a crucial role in modifying how foreign workers are incorporated into
the societies of the highly industrialized nation-states.

With regard to the politics of immigrant

resistance, Castles and Miller highlight how minority cultures emerge as a source of identity and as
a focus for resistance to exclusion and discrimination.66 They also hypothesize that:
[i]f political participation is denied through refusal of citizenship and failure to
provide channels of representation, immigrant politics is likely to take on militant
forms. This applies particularly to the children of immigrants born in the
countries of immigration. If they are excluded from political life through
non-citizenship, social marginalisation or racism, they are likely to present a major
challenge to existing political structures in the future.67
For instance, the movement of youth of North African origin in France has led to a new form of
citizenship, which, they have claimed, is “citizenship by participation” without necessarily being
nationals.68 Furthermore, at the regional level, the transnationalization of resistance movements led
by various immigrant associations has also taken place across Europe.69 In this respect, the
development of ethnic cultures, the stabilization of personal and group identities, and the formation
of ethnic communities are considered components of a single process, which is not self-contained
but rather develops dependent on the needs and experience of these minorities through their
constant interaction with the dominant group in the country of immigration.

That is, as foreign

workers are progressively integrated as the “ethnic minorities” within their host societies,
immigrants’ resistance movements against racial discrimination have posed serious challenges to the
modern notion of state citizenship by celebrating the development of multiculturalism.

This

development renders the incorporation of the “Others” an “unavoidable task” of the advanced
industrialized countries in contemporary globalization.
Thus, “new” social forces, especially resistance mobilized by immigrant workers, has not
only shaped power relations over immigration policymaking, but also necessitated the
reconsideration of the nation-state and its “citizenship.” Unlike the European industrialized
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countries of immigration, rapidly increasing number o foreign workers in Japan have produced no
remarkable self-organized resistance movements against their racialized acceptance in the society.
With this in mind, the absence of the countermovements mobilized by foreign laborers and the
potential for conflicting conditions in Japan should be examined.

Based on this theoretical

understanding of the dynamics of global labor migration, the following section will attempt not only
to holistically grasp the multifaceted and complex nature of rapidly escalating inflows of foreign
workers in Japan, but also to explore the impacts of labor inflows on Japan’s modern nation-state, a
conception anchored in the myth of cultural and ethnic homogeneity.

Throughout this case study,

it will be argued that the implementation of democratization driven by the development of
multiculturalism both in the state immigration policymaking and within the sphere of civil society
has been necessary to cope with conflicting situations stemming from the “unavoidable”
incorporation of foreign workers in Japanese society.

III. The Case Study: Japan and Foreign Labor Migration in Globalization
A. Historical Context: Japan’s Modernization and Foreign Workers
Massive inflows of foreign labor to Japan began in the mid-1980s. The estimated number
of foreign workers in Japan increased from 119,100 in 1986 to 600,700 in 1992 (including legal and
illegal workers).70 Although the proportion of foreign residents in Japan was the lowest among the
major industrialized countries, rapidly increasing foreign labor inflows generated a great deal of
debate on whether Japan should accept these foreign workers.

In particular, since Japan’s

immigration law strictly prohibited the entry of unskilled migrant workers, more attention was paid
toward the issue of the dramatically escalating inflows of illegal unskilled laborers to Japan (the
estimated number of illegal workers increased from 63,100 in 1986 to 292,800 in 199271).
debates largely divided into two lines, reflecting an “open” and a “closed” door policy.72

These
The

proponents of the kaikoku (open door policy) insisted that Japan should accept foreign labor by
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considering it an essential factor breaking down the exclusivity of Japanese society, which, they
claimed, delayed “internationalization.” On the other hand, the supporters of the sakoku (closed
door policy) opposed the increase in foreign workers by attributing Japan’s successful economic
development to the “peculiarity” of Japan’s ethnic homogeneity.

Toshio Iyotani has argued that the

positions of either accepting or refusing an inflow of foreign labor are indeed opposing views in one
sense, but that both sides divorced from Japan’s immigration issues from general global
immigration trends by focusing on homogeneity as the basis of Japanese society.73 That is, Japan’s
homogeneity is regarded as “backward” from the open door arguments, while the closed door
arguments consider it the strength of Japan’s economy and society.

With this in mind, for the

holistic analysis of the contemporary issue of foreign labor migration in Japan, it is vital not only to
briefly explain the historical process of construction of the myth of homogeneous ideology as the
basis of Japan’s modern nation-state and society, but also to explore the relation of this process to
the history of migration in Japan.
The perception of Japan as a nation of homogeneous people might have originated from its
long history of isolation (sakoku) from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, but, more likely,
had been ingeniously utilized as a political instrument since the Meiji Restoration of 1868.

By

opening the country (kaikoku) to the world, the Japanese leadership realized the necessity of
overcoming a sense of crisis in the face of Western power.

This was expressed in two

contradictory ways: while these leaders recognized the inevitability of importing Western learning
to sustain its political independence, they also acknowledged the necessity of rejecting Western
influences to maintain its indigenous identity.74 To become modernized yet remain “Japanese,” they
led to self-Orientalize Japan by consciously positioning itself as the West’s “Other.”75 In this
mechanism, by strategically incorporating both the naturalization of selected cultural characteristics
and the grafting of pseudo-scientific notions of biological determinism borrowed from the West, the
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Japanese nation-state was formed by idealizing cultural and “racial” homogeneity as its basis.76
Michael Weiner considers Japan’s high degree of overlap between race and nation as “the
racialization of an imagined community,” in which the criteria for membership was culturally and
biologically determined.77 That is, by underlining the idea that “nobody can become a Japanese,”78
Japan’s homogeneous ideology emphasized the exclusion of “Others” who did not share racial
lineage. Indeed, the use of the nineteenth-century terminologies sakoku and kaikoku in the recent
dispute on the acceptance of foreign workers signals that the Japanese interpret this issue not in
temporal isolation, but as an integral part of the historically continuing argument over how open
Japan’s relationship with the world should be.79
In historical terms, although the issue of international labor migrations had not been thrown
into the limelight in Japan until the late 1980s, foreign labor inflows to the country were not a new
phenomenon.

During WWII, Japan’s imperialist expansion conscripted Koreans and Chinese to

the country as replacement workers to satisfy emergent labor needs caused by the massive military
mobilization of the indigenous labor force: the number of the Koreans forcefully mitigated to Japan
totaled 2.3 million in 1945.80 Currently, the Koreans who remained in Japan and their descendents,
numbering approximately 700,000, constitute the largest ethnic minority community in the
country.81 However, despite the presence of Korean and Chinese residents since the prewar period,
much of the contemporary debate on foreign workers utterly ignores or denies this prewar history by
regarding these foreign residents as “invisible” immigrants or as a little more than a residual of the
history of military imperialism.82 More importantly, together with the historical integrations of
culturally different indigenous groups, the Ainu and Okinawans, the forceful incorporation of
foreign workers and their continuing residence in Japan have revealed that the ideology of the
Japanese as the homogeneous population is oblivious to the history of prewar Japanese
modernization; that is, it is myth, that is, historically and socially constructed reality.
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In the postwar period, the continued ramifications of the myth of ethnic homogeneity as the
essence of Japanese ideology have been articulated in the official unwillingness to accept the
ethnically and culturally different origins of people.

The Japanese Nationality Act, issued and

enshrined in 1950, has defined its citizenship by the principle of jus sanguinis, the ‘law of blood’ or
parental nationality, in contrast to the basis of jus soli, the ‘law of soil,’ whereby citizenship is the
right of everyone born within a state’s borders.83 Furthermore, labor shortages had been a recurrent
problem in Japan’s capitalist development since the 1960s, which promoted the debate about the
acceptance of foreign workers among Japanese officials and employers.

Yet, Japan maintained its

exclusive immigration policies until late-1989, and only opened the door to limited personnel
qualified in professional and technical fields while strictly prohibiting the entry of unskilled foreign
labor, largely on the grounds that such an influx might endanger the seamless racial homogeneity of
Japanese society.84
During the period from the latter half of 1965 to the mid-1970s, the Japanese economy
experienced a conspicuously high rate of growth accompanied by severe scarcity of
workers—particularly flexible unskilled labor.
high growth, dramatic urbanization occurred.

Responding to the additional labor necessary for
In fact, approximately 10 million internal labor

migrants, mainly as seasonal workers, had moved from rural to urban areas during the 1960s, but
their availability as industrial labor fell sharply by the end of the 1960s, owing to long-term
sustained high economic growth.85 Against the sequential emergence of discussions about the
possible introduction of unskilled foreign migrant workers under the tight labor market conditions,
the Japanese government decided not to accept such workers on three occasions (in 1967, 1973, and
1976).86 Reflecting the “miracle” growth of Japan’s economy of this period without experiencing
the massive inflows of new immigrant labor, Japanese businessmen and government officials
claimed that Japan’s industrial prowess derived largely from the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of
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its population.

This belief was highlighted in the former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s

notorious remark made in a 1986 speech, which criticized the U.S. for its competitive backwardness
stemming from its racial diversity.87 The spread of the Nihonjinron literature (literature of
“Japaneseness”) has also filled the ideological needs of conservative politics not by precisely
depicting the Japanese society with its reality of actual “ethnic” diversity as well as differences in
material conditions among individuals and localities, but rather by addressing it with the idealized
images of the homogeneous society as a whole.88 That is, dialectically reinforced as the driving
force of Japan’s successful economic development, the myth of Japanese racial and cultural
homogeneity has continued to play an essential role at the core of Japan’s contemporary
conservative political discourse in constructing the predominant ideology of Japan.
In contrast to foreign labor schemes launched by most Western highly developed nations to
solve a shortage of workers during the same period, some Western analysts interpreted that postwar
Japan made the ‘deliberate’ choice not to introduce workers from abroad by emphasizing cultural
considerations rather than economic forces in making migration policy

89

From this perspective

shedding light on the Japanese rapid industrialization without relying on foreign-born workers to fill
significant numbers of low-level jobs as a “exceptional case,” Japan’s success is considered the
proof that economic growth can be achieved by relying on labor-saving innovation without relying
on mass immigration.90 Yet, in the late-1980s, Japan noticeably lost its status as the exceptional
case among advanced industrialized nation-states when rapidly developed inflows of massive
foreign labor came to Japan.

By examining both domestic and global contexts to explain the

twenty-year time-lag between the 1960s, when the labor shortage in Japan become a problem, and
the 1980s, when the massive inflow of unskilled and low-wage foreign workers began, Iyotani has
highlighted the following five factors.91
First, Japanese companies successfully managed to raise labor productivity by pursuing
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improvements in manufacturing technologies.

In the 1970s in particular, the development of

microelectronics, mechanization and automation promoted further technological advancement in
manufacturing, and, as a result, there was less demand for unskilled workers in the labor market.
Second, longer working hours were maintained during the rapid economic growth period.

Also,

elderly people and married women, who were encouraged to participate in the labor market,
contributed to preserving a supply of low-wage labor.

Third, the existence of appropriate

conditions—such as the flexible hiring policies of companies and the use of housewives and
students as temporary and part-time workers—made the maintenance of the flexibility of the labor
market possible.

Fourth, the Japanese economic development slowed down with the oil shocks in

the mid-1970s, which was an important external factor in postponing the influx of foreign workers
to Japan.92 Finally, since the latter half of the 1970s, production and assembly operations have
increasingly relocated from Japan into East and Southeast Asian countries where cheap and ready
sources of labor exist.

The trend of foreign direct investment by Japanese companies accelerated

in the 1980s, a development closely related to the rapid increase of foreign labor immigrants in
Japan (this point will be further examined below).

In sum, under these conditions, most Japanese

in the 1960s and 1970s never considered employing foreign workers to make up for the labor
shortage.93 In other words, Japan’s economic success without immigration was not simply the result
of a deliberate governmental and/or societal decision not to import foreign labor, but rather that of a
sophisticated combination of structural factors in its domestic and international realms.
Unlike the period of the 1960-70s, the re-emergence of an acute labor shortage through
Japan’s abnormally brisk economic activities beginning from the mid-1980s, the so-called “bubble”
economy, caused dramatic streams of foreign labor migrants to flow into Japan.

These migrant

workers consisted not only of skilled (and therefore legally permissible) laborers but also of
unskilled laborers prohibited from work in Japan.

In this respect, since the mid-1980s, Japan’s

26

emergence as one of the major labor immigration countries in the world has posed a essential
challenge to Japan’s conservative immigration policy and, more strikingly, the myth of Japan as a
racially and culturally homogeneous nation-state.

But first the changes causing the dramatically

increasing immigration of foreign workers into Japan should be examined from the critical IPE
perspective.

This analysis will not only clarify the intimate correlation between the dramatic

inflows of skilled and unskilled foreign workers in Japan and the restructuring of its economy in the
context of contemporary globalization, but also will posit that foreign workers, especially unskilled
ones, have begun to play a key role as an indispensable labor-force in the structurally evolving
Japanese economy and, consequently, as a new actor in Japanese society.

B. The Globalization of the Japanese Economy and Foreign Workers
The onset of Japan’s high economic growth in the mid-1980s generated a marked
expansion of total labor demand, consequently leading to a boost in demand for foreign workers.
Compared with the situation under the 1960-70s’ economic boom, Japan’s labor market was deemed
considerably rigid, partially the result of significant demographic transformations stemming from
the country’s extremely low fertility rate and the rapid ageing of its population.94 However, Hiromi
Mori posits that “…the existing labor force was more fully employed in the 1960s and early 1970s.
One should note here that the use of foreign workers emerged in response to the comparatively less
tight [labor] market of the recent Heisei economic expansion.”95 In further exploring the
implications of Mori’s interpretation, David Bartram sheds light on the fact that the ratio of job
openings to applicants was much higher in the early 1970s than in the late 1980s.96 With in this
mind, the analysis of the restructuring of Japanese economy within the larger framework of the
progressively interconnected global economy, primarily manifested by the internationalization of
production and the concomitant specialization of the global division of labor, is imperative to
explore the question of what has caused labor immigration to Japan.
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Since the late 1970s, the significant development of Japanese economy, particularly in
terms of increased income levels, has made Japan an attractive destination for labor migrants from
neighboring Asian developing countries, nearly all of which have insufficient domestic demands for
labor, considerable unemployment or underemployment, and large labor surpluses.

The sudden

appreciation of the Japanese yen in the wake of the Plaza Accords of 1985 expanded the income
differentials between Japan and these countries, which continued to widen rapidly in the remainder
of the decade.

In 1988, for example, Japan’s per capita income was 123 times higher than that of

Bangladesh, 64 times that of China, 60 times that of Pakistan, and 33 times that of the Philippines.97
Such disparities have enormously raised the level of wage expectations in Japan and created an
economic magnet for would-be migrants.

Wage differentials, however, cannot be regarded as a

single incentive of the rapidly intensified influx of labor immigration into Japan from the late-1980s,
because Japan’s income level has been constantly higher than those of the adjacent countries of Asia
since the late 1960s, when other Asians did not seek extensively to migrate into Japan.98
The rising value of the yen following the Plaza Accords encouraged a seemingly endless
process of investment-led economic growth in Japan.

Along with the escalation of labor scarcity,

the upsurge of domestic labor cost and its adverse implications for accelerating competitiveness in
the global economy have facilitated the relocation of labor-intensive manufacturing production
through extensive foreign direct investment (FDI) and overseas development assistance (ODA)
initiatives, a strategy designed to take advantage of the strong yen (which made investment abroad
cheaper) and seek cheap labor.

From 1975 to 1987, the number of overseas subsidiary firms

established by Japanese corporations rose from 339 to 1,307.99 The significant crunch of both
Japan’s FDI and ODA has concentrated in Asia.

FDI in the rest of Asia conducted by Japanese

MNCs grew at a rate of about 20 percent a year from 1980 to 1985 and at a much greater rate in the
latter half of the 1980s.100 As a result, Japan is the largest foreign investor in Indonesia, Malaysia
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and Thailand, and the second largest in Singapore and the Philippines.

In the 1980s, the dramatic

increase of Japanese ODA made Japan the single largest donor of ODA in Asia.101 By the early
1990s, some in governmental and intellectual circles began to emphasize the internationalization of
production through FDI and ODA initiatives as a purposely enlightened policy to curb much labor
migration by hypothesizing its effect of the reduction of manual jobs in Japan and large-scale job
creation in prospective sending countries.102 However, in addressing flows of predominantly Asian
foreign workers in Japan, the fact that a high percentage of foreign workers have originated from
areas dominated by Japanese FDI should be clarified.
John Clammer argues that “Japanese capital which has spurred growth elsewhere in East
and Southeast Asia has also spurred the influx of labor from those very regions into Japan itself.”103
In fact, foreigners of Asian origin accounted for 78.1 percent of total registrants.104 Furthermore, in
terms of illegal labor inflows to Japan, appreciation data indicates that during the late 1980s, when
Japan began establishing off-shore factories and other types of investment in Malaysia, illegal labor
migration from Malaysian to Japan increased.105 This pattern underscores the critical IPE
perspective by suggesting that Asian countries’ “new industrialization” assisted by FDI and ODA
originated from Japan as well as the presence of and employment at the Japanese plants have
developed a familiarity with the Japanese economy and way of life, which makes the perceptional
distance smaller and, consequently, elevates the incentive to go and work there among the
“would-be” immigrant workers.

That is, the “flexible restructuring” of Japan’s economy through

the internationalization of production as its effort to cope with the problem of its labor shortage not
only has encouraged the formation of permanent transnational pathway between Japan and the
countries receiving Japanese FDI and ODA, but also enhanced Japan’s image as an affluent land of
earning opportunity and potential destination for migration.

In other words, since the mid-1980s,

when Japan suffered from its acute shortage of labor, the combination of Japan’s considerably high
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average of income per capita and its visible presence in the global and, more precisely, regional
political economy as Asia’s economic “locomotive” convincingly induced immigration to Japan.

It

was also in this period that a new upsurge of emigration pressure within Asia was created by the
remarkable outflow of Asian workers from the Middle East, due to declining petroleum prices and
heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf region.

Under this situation, migrant workers as well as

state officials in the country of emigration in this region turned to Japan.

The governments of

sending countries, such as China (1988), the Philippines (1987) and Korea (1988), persuaded the
Japanese government to facilitate the employment of migrant labor.106 In this context, despite the
Japanese government’s continuous prohibition on the entrance of unskilled labor since the second
half of the 1980s, Japan has experienced a dramatic increase in the number of foreign
workers—predominantly illegal unskilled workers—from the rest of Asia.
To further explore the cause of these labor flows, Japan’s attraction for foreign workers
should be considered in terms of three aspects, which have been structurally created by the
transforming nature of labor demand through the restructuring process of Japan’s economy.

First,

the rapidly deepening manpower deficit along with the dramatic growth of Japan’s economy
imposed difficulty predominantly on small- and medium-sized companies, which had played an
essential role in Japan’s economic development during the period of 1960s and 1970s.

To curtail

labor demand and also to minimize labor costs, large-sized companies favored the externalization of
their labor-intensive processes by subcontracting their activities or redeploying production bases
abroad, whereas, in small- and medium-sized companies, these options were less feasible.

This

tendency was associated with not only the insufficient financial resources of small companies but
also their immobility, particularly in the construction industry and the rapidly expanding service
sector.107 Indeed, significantly acute shortage of labor in small firms is deeply rooted in the “dual”
Japanese economic structure consisting of a few large firms and numerous small subcontractors.108
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Within the context of a highly competitive global economy, parent companies have exercised tighter
controls over their subcontractors by claiming reductions in both costs and delivery times.
Consequently, the subcontracting firms have faced the increasing necessity of low-cost and flexible
labor, but have been constrained in their use of indigenous workers largely because of their
comparatively low-wage and inferior working conditions, a commonly characteristic of the
construction and low value-added service industries.

For the employers of small companies,

unskilled foreign workers, who are willing to accept low wages and insecure working conditions,
have offered a new source of cheap, flexible labor.

Hence, the severe scarcity of workers in

small-and medium sized companies, stemming from the rapidly expanding demand for labor and
from the structural transformation of Japanese economy, has intensified their reliance on foreign
laborers.
Second, under the conditions of an eroding supply of young labor due to Japan’s low
fertility rate, the growing trend of high-job aspirations among younger local workers driven by an
intimate correlation between occupational prestige and educational attainment in Japanese society
has made labor scarcity serious in “socially undesirable jobs,” characterized as “3K”—kiken, kitsui,
and kitanai in Japanese (dangerous, difficult, and dirty).109 The advancement of higher education
has not only multiplied the supply of well-educated young applicants with sufficient qualifications
to adapt themselves to the latest technologies, but also generated a bias among graduates to
determine an occupational preference dependent on levels of educational attainment.

This

qualitative change in the labor market has been accompanied by Japan’s advanced economy that has
provided the well-educated Japanese as new labor-market entrants with rich working opportunities
represented by great rewards and prestige.

In these trends, closely interrelated with Japan’s dual

industrial structure, severe and persistent labor shortages have occurred in such industries as
construction, certain segments of low-technology manufacturing, and low value-added service,
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which have been progressively shunned by younger Japanese workers because of their “3K” as well
as “bottom-wage” and “dead-end” nature of jobs.110 Not only Japan’s relatively high wage level but
also the huge number of job vacancies at the lower segment of industrial sector as a result of
Japanese job preference has attracted foreign labor to Japan.

In fact, by 1992, the construction

sector alone, in which conditions were estimated as nearly 40 percent shy of its full labor
complement, employed approximately 120,000 foreign workers.111 Consequently, through
performing unskilled labor, which the Japanese themselves are no longer willing to do, foreign
workers turned out to be an indispensable, yet supposedly disposable, labor-force for supporting the
basic structure of the Japanese economy.
Finally, along with the deindustrialization of Japanese economy facilitated by the
internationalization of production, “global cities” have emerged and accelerated the demand for
unskilled labor in Japan.

The urban life-style, exemplified by the externalization of many

household services owing to the intensified participation of housewives in labor market, has
developed the new types of service sectors, such as retail trade and restaurants.

The expansion of

the service industries, which are generally labor-intensive and small- or medium-sized, has escalated
the requirements for cheap and flexible labor.

For instance, from 1975 to 1990, services and

wholesale/retail trade and restaurants absorbed 5.4 million and 2.9 million employees respectively,
while the manufacturing industry added only 1.6 million.112 Furthermore, Japan’s indigenous
dynamics of urbanization and, more strikingly, its progressing involvement in global political
economy have transnationalized its major cities, such as Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe and
Yokohama.113 These cities have attracted professionals and skilled transients from all over the
world, and, at the same time, the widening void of unskilled labor in these areas, especially
promoted by the predominant concentrations of such industries as construction, low-technology
manufacturing and labor-intensive services, has been filled by foreign workers.

While 817 of
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1,050 foreign enterprises are located in Tokyo, illegal unskilled migrant workers accounted for over
30 percent of total foreign workers in this area in 1994.114 In sum, these major Japanese cities have
embraced the characteristics of “global cities,” not only by serving as global command centers for
corporations, but equally by diversifying the composition of their populations.

Indeed, these

“global cities” have functioned as a significant magnet for skilled as well as unskilled labor
migrants to the country.
Together with the increasing rigidity of the labor market due to demographic
transformations led by the low fertility rate and the accelerated ageing of the society in Japan, the
rapid development and the coincided restructuring of Japan’s economy since the mid-1980s have
created a severe shortage of labor.

In this sense, the demand for foreign workers in the Japanese

economy is derived not from a cyclical but rather a structural labor scarcity.

Furthermore, the

exigent demand for cheap and flexible labor at the lower industrial segment has provided attractive
opportunities for foreign workers, who have been induced by the combination of Japan’s image of
affluence and its very visible presence overseas, to bring their migrations to Japan to fruition.

On

the other hand, Japanese small- and medium-sized firms have evolved their structural dependences
on foreign workers as a flexible labor-force, partially facilitated by the progressively
institutionalized foreign labor market with the development of labor-broker networks.115 In this
context, the Japanese government had responded to the escalating labor shortage by encouraging the
further rationalization of labor market and the further mechanization and internationalization of
production until the 1990s.

Yet, since these strategies are limited for most small- and

medium-sized companies, the massive influx of illegal foreign workers to Japan continued.

In this

respect, Japan’s immigration policy reform in 1990 and its consequences need to be elaborated to
fully capture the dynamics of contemporary foreign labor immigrations to Japan.

The implications

of the Japanese immigration policies over labor flow characteristics and the impact of the entries of
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legal and illegal migrant workers on the modern Japanese nation-state and its society will be
explored.

C. Japan’s Revised Immigration Policies: The “Side-Door” Policies and Class and Ethnicity
The Immigration Control Act of 1951 provided the fundamental legislative framework for
Japanese regulation for the foreigners’ employment in the country.

Under the Act rules, the entry

into and residence in Japan of foreigners, including those who are to be employed, are controlled on
the basis of the status-of-residence system, which categorizes the activities that a foreigner is
permitted to perform.116 Together with both the legal criteria for a citizenship based on the principle
of jus sanguinis, Japan’s restrictive legal admission and its perception of foreign workers only on a
temporary-basis had historically characterized its state immigration policy.

Yet, since the

mid-1980s, within the context of an increasingly interconnected and interdependent global economy,
Japan has found itself in a rapid increase of the number of foreign labor immigration, facilitated by
the restructuring of their capitalist economy.

Responding to a dramatically escalated influx of

foreign workers, the Japanese government initiated the reconsideration of its official approaches
toward the entries of both skilled and unskilled foreign laborers and revised the immigration law in
1990.

This amendment exemplifies the convergent tendency of the internationalization and

renationalization of state among the highly industrialized nation-states as the response to the
restructuring of global economy.

More crucially, the consequences of the revision of law have

created the contradictory conditions between the maintenance of the notion of the modern
nation-state and the dialectical influence of the increasing inflows of foreign labor over the
transformations of state/society complex within the context of contemporary globalization.
In the 1990 revision, state officials announced that the law was amended to effectively deal
with both the changing requirements stemming from the accelerating processes of economic
globalization and the increasing number of illegal workers and, consequently, the infringements of
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their human rights in the country.117 This revision addressed three major provisions: 1)
rearrangement and enlargement of resident statuses under the categories of skilled activities; 2)
classification of the standards for immigration screening and simplification of landing procedures;
and 3) strengthening of measures against the recruitment and employment of illegal foreign workers
(primarily unskilled labor).118 That is, the revised Act has responded to the significant inflows of
skilled workers and professionals in the progressively diversified field of work by liberalizing
opportunities for the admission of skilled foreign workers, but has tightened the regulations with
regard to the recruitment and employment of unskilled immigrant laborers.

In fact, the number of

permissible job categories for foreigners to work and reside legally in Japan has expanded from 18
to 27, including legal/accounting services and intra-company transferees.119 In this regard, it can be
deemed that the 1990 policy reform has aimed to establish an institutional framework for promoting
the admission of a qualified workforce in relation to economic globalization.
On the other hand, by maintaining a restraining regulation for the entrance of unskilled
foreign workers, the 1990 amendment has established for the first time severe penalties against
employers who illegally employ foreign workers as well as brokers who find jobs for these
workers.120 This tightened restrictive approach to unskilled labor migration has reflected the
Japanese officials’ consideration that any short-term benefits brought about by cheap and flexible
unskilled labor of foreign immigrants may be outnumbered by the long-term social and political
costs through their integration in the society.

Deeply lying behind these changes were, as Yoko

Sellek and Michael Weiner note, “the often expressed fears that a continued influx of unskilled
migrant labor would generate social tensions,” which, more strikingly, they have termed as the
anxiety for “cultural or ethnic contamination” through the high possibility for temporary workers to
transform into permanent settlers and marginalized into ethnic minorities over time.121 That is,
while experiencing rapidly increasing inflows of unskilled labor, Japan’s revised Act attempted to
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tightly regulate these flows by reinventing political rhetoric that racialized the social contracts
binding its society together.122 Thus, the 1990 revision of Japan’s immigration policies
demonstrates how the internationalization and renationalization of the Japanese state has influenced
the state’s immigration policy in a time of economic globalization.
In addition, the 1990 revision created ad hoc, the so-called “side-door” policies to
ameliorate the shortages of a low-cost labor source in response to the lodged complaints from smalland medium-sized employers.123 The revised Act has allowed the Nikkeijin (Japanese descendants
up to the third generation and their spouses, mainly of Brazilian and Peruvian origins) to enter, work
and live in Japan with no job restrictions, by obtaining the status of the new category, a “long-term”
resident.124 Reflecting this change, the entries of the Nikkeijin had increased dramatically—from
8,450 in 1988 to 148,700 in 1991 and 220,844 in 1998,125—and, they have expanded the labor pool
as “legal” foreign unskilled labor.

Furthermore, the acceptance of foreign trainees via the

“company trainee” program to offer job training in Japan has expanded threefold between 1986
(14,400) and 1991 (43,600).126 In principle, the purpose of the trainee system is “to contribute to
the industrial, social, and economic development in various developing countries through an attempt
to transfer technological, technical skills, expertise and/or knowledge which have been accumulated
in Japan.”127 Yet, derived from the understanding that company trainees are not by definition
employees, employers do not possess the legal obligation to pay full wages but only nominal
remuneration for the employees’ on-the-job training.

For this reason, employers are attracted to

the training programs and, more crucially, as Hiroshi Komai remarks, many of them have instituted
them to obtain disguised cheap foreign labor.128 The revised Act has also permitted the “pre-college
students,” mostly in language and vocational schools, to work a maximum of four hours a day. In
reality, however, these students (mainly from China, Korea, and Taiwan) work longer hours as
unskilled labor mainly in the service industry, such as restaurants and hotels by violating the law.129
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By opening the “side-door” to inflows of foreign unskilled workers, the 1990 revision
reflects the Japanese state’s compromise between its previous closed-door policy and industry’s
strong demand for cheap foreign workers.

Furthermore, the humanitarian problems stemming

from the severe exploitation of migrant labor were addressed as one of the main concerns in the
revision of the Act, but the new law has left out any discussion about these problems.130 More
strikingly, while the state’s ineffective control over the continuing inflows of illegal labor (even
after the enforcement of severe penalties131) indicates an erosion of state sovereignty, it also can be
considered the tacit acceptance among the state authority of foreign labor’s entry through the
“back-door” by recognizing the deepening dependence of the Japanese economy on these
laborers.132 That is, since the 1990 revision of the Act, the issue of foreign labor migration has
become increasingly complex by embracing massive amounts of unskilled migrant workers
employed under different legal and employment conditions.133 Indeed, the inflows of a large
number of both legal and illegal foreign workers to Japan have not only led to the increased
deterritorializing of the state but also to the problematizing of the image of homogeneous society as
the essential basis of the modern Japanese nation-state.
The de facto legalization of the resident status of the Nikkeijin reveals the intentions of the
Japanese political and business establishment to alleviate a crippling unskilled labor shortage and,
simultaneously, to preserve the myth of “racial” homogeneity of the society.

The Nikkeijin have

been expected as “less foreign” and therefore acceptable because, sharing the same lineage, they
would be culturally compatible regardless of nationality.134 Yet, such local assumptions that they
must understand Japanese customs have intensified the incongruity with the current reality of the
Nikkeijin in Japan consisting of mostly third-generation descendents who are largely unfamiliar with
the Japanese language and culture.135 In this regard, their return-migrations embody psychological
experiences quite distinct from other labor migrants in Japan.

As Sassen notes through her

37

interview with the Nikkeijin returned from Japan, their experiences are quite dismal: “the jobs were
hard and dirty, they received no respect, they were not seen as Japanese. Many have returned
defeated and humiliated.”136 The discriminatory attitudes among the Japanese toward the Nikkeijin
who are physically Japanese but culturally and linguistically South American have raised a serious
question concerning the ethnic boundary between Japanese and foreigners supposedly divided by
the idea of a Japanese “race” as the cultural and pseudo-biological homogeneity.

Indeed, the influx

of these “ethnically” Japanese has joined with the presence of the third generation of Korean and
Chinese permanent residents (who are “sociologically” Japanese since they do not share Japanese
lineage or nationality but share its culture and language) and indigenous ethnic groups, such as the
Ainu and Okinawans, to further challenge Japan’s long-standing assumption of “one nation and one
ethnicity.”137 Thus, the prevailing presence of the Nikkeijin, as the consequence of immigration
policy-approach from the conservative political discourse, has compellingly generated a
contradiction within the meaning of Japanese identity constructed through its modern nation-state
formation.
The Japanese state regulatory constraints on immigration also cause the notion of Japan’s
modern society to become precarious by creating the multilayered structure for foreign migrant
labor in the country.

In these layers, the professionals and skilled laborers qualified under the

legally permitted job categories can be deemed as positioning at the highest.

Although the total

number of officially employed has represented a sharp increase since the 1980s, even after the
enlargement of the status-of-residence, it has accounted for a rather minor proportion of foreign
newcomers as a whole, and, consequently, its overall significance in Japanese society is being
overwhelmed by the massive influx of unskilled workers.138 Analysis should therefore place more
emphasis on the emerging “class stratification” within the foreign manual-labor market and its
impact on the Japanese society.

The acceptance of the Nikkeijin as the “legal” unskilled workers
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has caused their wage levels to soar, creating what Sellek calls the emergence of migrant labor
“aristocracy.”139 In addition, despite the gradual relaxation in the implementations of the trainee
program, it continues to impose financial constraints on companies.

Thus the costs associated with

using these side-door channels have inevitably induced many small firms to rely on illegals,
eventually facilitating the continuing massive inflows of these workers.

The study by the Overseas

Japanese Association underscores the stratification of unskilled foreign labor market by revealing
that the Nikkeijin have concentrated in automobile and electrical manufacturing factories, whereas
illegal Asians have tended toward much tougher and dirtier conditions, such as construction and
low-tier service industries.140 In sum, unskilled foreign workers in Japan have developed the class
structure based on their legal status, while the gap widens between the official legal position and the
actual state of affairs.

Takashi Miyajima has also called attention to the ethnic segmentations

among Asian unskilled labor migrants.141 Miyajima argues that promotion opportunities available
to these migrants in the Japanese employment hierarchy largely depend on their language
similarities with the Japanese—the use of the same Chinese characters.

That is, structural

stratification among foreign unskilled workers is based not on individuals’ talent or experience but
rather on their legal status as well as their ethnic and linguistic origins.
Intricate segmentation among foreign unskilled labor contains vital implications for
Japanese notions of social stratification.

Citing a survey reporting that nearly 90 percent of

Japanese population identify themselves as members of the “middle-class,” Mika Mervio posits that
Japan perceives itself as a classless society with having high levels of social equality and low
income differentials.142 Japanese self-perception as overwhelmingly middle-class is largely driven
by the postwar socioeconomic policies which has emphasized a greater degree of equality than at
any previous time in Japanese history, although social discrimination against ethnic
minorities—Korean, Okinawans and Ainu, for instance—has been common.

Within the
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supposedly classless society of the modern Japan, the rapidly prevailing presence of foreign workers
has created a new proletariat.

This new class is clarified not only as a “lumpenproletariat”—

rootless, unstable, (mostly) legally unprotected and earning lower wages than the Japanese
proletariat—but also an “ethno-class” distinguished by its racial and cultural difference from the
Japanese mainstream and split ethnically and linguistically within itself.143 In this respect, the de
facto existence of foreign labor migrants problematizes the relationship of class and ethnicity in
Japan, a question with which other highly industrialized countries in the West have had
comparatively long experience.144 In Japan, the relationship between class and ethnicity has been
historically undermined by the prevalence and common acceptance of the myth of Japan as a
monoethnic nation-state.145 In other words, contemporary labor immigration in Japan has not only
created a new class in Japanese society but also provides the significant incentive to reconsider
social structure whose ideological foundations continue to be reinforced by the marginalization of,
and ignorance about, many forms of cultural diversity in its midst.
Thus, contemporary foreign labor immigration in Japan has largely been shaped by state
immigration policies and, in turn, have also deterritorialized the state and destabilized the idea of the
modern Japanese nation-state historically derived from the myth of homogeneity.

The impacts of

foreign labor migration on Japanese society have been more sophisticated, since these laborers have
not dramatically decreased in number despite Japan’s recession since late 1991.

Rather, the

growing tendency has been to remain in Japan for a longer period and to “settle” in the country.146
These trends have failed to meet the prevailing expectation among the Japanese that foreign workers
are temporary, disposable “guest workers,” utilized only during growth periods, and, sequentially
and crucially, underlined the consideration of the social consequences of migrant laborers’ transition
to long-term residents as vital in holistically comprehending the current problems of foreign
workers in Japan.

In this respect, both the multidimensional problems of racialization against
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foreign workers and the restructuring of power relationships in the politics of migration with the
emergence of “new” social forces needs to be examined.

In this examination, the reasons for the

abovementioned question of the absence of self-organized resistance movements by foreign workers
in Japan and the key elements for Japan’s “unavoidable task” to integrate the “Others” in the rapidly
globalizing world will be explored.

D. The Politics of Migration in Japan: “New” Social Forces and “Double Democratization”
Most foreign workers, regardless of legal status, have faced great difficulties to be
incorporated in Japan, while the deepening social involvement of these “Others” has fomented
social unrest in Japan’s modern nation-state and society.

The Japanese law is based on the idea

that “citizenship” is closely connected with nationality, principally conferred by origin.

In this

context, it is considered as a highly exceptional procedure for individuals of different origins to
acquire full citizenship through naturalization as new members of a nation.147 Indeed, foreign
residents, including permanent Korean residents, are all precluded from participating in the political
sphere on the grounds that “sovereignty rests with the Japanese nation.”148 These restrictive
regulations with regard to the incorporation of foreigners in Japan have underscored the myth of
homogeneity of Japan’s modern nation-state, but, in the context of economic globalization, they are
obstacles to attract the inflows of skilled workers, which are encouraged by the Japanese political
and business leaders.

Go No, a head of the firm recruiting Chinese computer experts upon

requests from Japanese companies, notes that “many Chinese workers prefer to go to the West
(rather than come to Japan) which offers them more security to build a future by giving them
permanent status.”149 However, unskilled laborers tend to face far more severe obstacles to their
integration into the Japanese society.
Together with the racialization of Japan’s recruitment highlighted by the acceptance of the
Nikkeijin, institutionalized and societal-based racial discrimination has disadvantaged both legal and,
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more severely, illegal unskilled workers in terms of their employment conditions and social
practices (housing, medical care, and education, etc.).

Although Japanese labor law guarantees

labor standards and rights irrespective of nationality and status of residence, migrant unskilled
workers have suffered from inferior wages and working conditions.

Wage levels of migrant

workers are largely determined by factors such as legitimacy, forms of employment contract, and
personal skills, especially proficiency in Japanese.

The Nikkeijin constitute the highest stratum in

terms of wage rates among foreign unskilled workers owing to their legitimacy, earning wages
comparable to their Japanese counterparts.

Yet, notwithstanding their legal resident status, the

Nikkeijin have been exploited and mistreated by employers and foreign-labor brokers.

For

example, large portions of their wages are deducted to cover commission fees and travel expenses to
Japan.150 In the case of illegal workers, the situations have been more brutal.

Many of these

illegals are excluded from the benefits that native and legal foreign workers regularly acquire,
including paid holiday and overtime payments.151 Some employers have refused to pay any wages
to unauthorized workers at all.152 Widespread violations of standard labor protection for illegal
workers by unscrupulous employers often go unreported because of workers’ fear to disclose their
clandestine status, possibly leading to deportation.
Difficult conditions are also experienced by foreign workers living in Japan in terms of
social rights.

One of the first challenges to be faced is racial discrimination while searching for

adequate housing.

Many Japanese landlords refuse to accept foreigners as tenants, especially

illegal entrants who are mostly without guarantors or character references.153 Given the
concentration of foreign workers in urban areas, high rents and discriminatory attitudes leave them
with no choice but to find shelter in overcrowded apartments or even in the nation’s public parks.154
In addition, despite the recent removal of Japanese nationality as a prerequisite of eligibility for
national health insurance, various factors, such as employers’ reluctance to pay additional expenses
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and foreign-workers’ anxieties about exposure of illegal employment, have prevented foreign
workers from enrolling in health insurance and having access to medical services.

Medical

protection is still scarce for both legal and illegal foreign workers, while job-related accidents
involving immigrant working in particularly dangerous “3K” industries has risen.155 The rapid
increase of unpaid medical expenses by foreign workers, mostly because of their financial inabilities,
has also brought about the new social problem in Japan.156 As the process of migratory inflows in
Japan is gradually transformed into a settlement phase characterized by migrants’ prolonged stay
with family formation and reunification, the education of foreign children has engendered another
salient social issue.

Over the past five years, the number of foreign children attending local

Japanese schools has significantly increased and most of these children have encountered serious
language problems under Japan’s educational system which regards proficiency in Japanese as its
fundamental prerequisite.157 The inaction of the state officials has resulted in the underdevelopment
of educational infrastructure to deal with the rapid progress of internationalization in schools.

A

considerable portion of these children are discriminated against and find themselves barred access to
equal education.158 Moreover, the mass media’s persuasion of the criminal image of foreign
workers who deteriorate the racial harmony of Japanese society has facilitated xenophobia among
the Japanese.159 Thus, for foreign workers who have been intensely involved in Japanese society,
there are various obstacles stemming from the racial discrimination against them, which has been
firmly institutionalized within the framework of state regulations and also deeply inserted in the
way of thinking of them as the “Others” among the Japanese.
With the rise of the serious questions of human rights violations in Japan, the pressures
from other states and the supranational human rights regime has not only criticized the institutional
and societal practices of racial discrimination in Japan but also constrained state power over
immigration issues.

For instance, as for Japan’s controversial recruitment of the Nikkeijin from the
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viewpoint of equality among foreign nationals in the country, even the Brazilian government and
media have criticized the Japanese position by claming that Japanese discriminatory hiring has
caused a furor in Brazil.160 Furthermore, in 1999, for the first time, the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (which was adopted by the United Nations in
1965 and ratified by Japan in 1995) was applied in a case brought by a female Brazilian journalist,
who was ejected from a jewellery store solely for being a foreigner, to claim damages based on
racism.

In this case, the judge declared that since there are no domestic laws in Japan barring

racial discrimination, the international aforementioned convention could be deemed to be operative
as domestic law.161 Although the enforcement mechanisms of the international regime for migration
over the sovereign nation-states is still questionable in practice,162 the accelerating application of
codes of international human rights to domestic cases will constrain Japan’s state sovereignty based
on its racially exclusive immigration policies.
Unlike European countries, Japan has not encountered notable unified resistance
movements led by newcomer foreign migrant workers themselves as “new” counterhegemonic
social forces against the state.

This, to a large extent, is derived from the fragmented nature of the

ethnic migrant communities in Japan.

The fragmentation of migrant communities is partially

caused by the class stratification among foreign workers that was examined above.

Owing to their

different legal statuses, each group claims its own goals and demands—e.g., the Nikkeijin demand
better employment conditions, while illegal Asians want their stay in Japan to be legalized—and,
consequently, the mobilization of a resistance movement based on the sense of solidarity or desire
for joint achievement among them has been difficult.

In this sense, the Japanese state’s policy of

“different rules for different people” has effectively repressed possible countermovements by
foreign labor immigrants.163 Indeed, the study of changes in the number of registrants by prefecture
and nationality reveals that despite noticeable concentration of newcomers in the Tokyo
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metropolitan area and the Tokai area (Aichi and Shizuoka prefectures), the wider nationwide
dispersions, by reflecting not only their distinct occupational profile but also some variations even
among the same ethnic groups, have characterized the geographical distribution of newcomers’
residency.164 In terms of illegal unskilled workers who are missing from these registration statistics,
although it is difficult to gauge their geographical allocation because of no reliable nationwide data,
Clammer points out their urban-oriented residential tendency largely being attracted by plentiful
work-opportunities in the “global cities” but, at the same time, relatively distributed throughout the
working class residential areas of Japanese industrial cities.165 Along with these spatial dispersions
of both legal and illegal foreign migrant workers, due to little social interaction taking place
between different segments of ethnically and linguistically diversified migrant worker populations,
there are no “divided cities” of ghetto or slums in Japan, which are familiar phenomena in the
Western host countries of immigration.

Consequently, while foreign labor migrants constitute an

underclass with various socioeconomic disadvantages, the fragmented nature of their communities
stemming from class stratification among them and their geographical dispersion has resulted in the
lack of class-consciousness within immigrant workers, a prime force to mobilize resistance
movements.

In this sense, they are not for the most part a “class-for-itself.”166 In addition,

particularly for illegal migrant laborers, there is the natural unwillingness to draw public attention to
their illegality by organizing and claming their rights collectively, which has intensified their
marginality, alienation, and vulnerability to be exploited.167
Attempts to improve the disadvantaged situations of foreign workers and to empower them
have been carried out somewhat by local governments and, more actively, by humanitarian
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Japan through involving in the politics of migration as
“new” social forces.

As Wayne Cornelius observes, “the glaring contradiction between what is

going on at the municipal level and the rigid, hard-line policy of bureaucrats at the national levels is
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one of the most interesting facets of the contemporary immigration phenomenon in Japan.”168
Especially in the ‘company towns’ where there are heavy concentrations of small- and
medium-manufacturing plants, local authorities appear more willing to accommodate immigrants
than their national counterparts.

For example, the municipal officials in Hamamatsu City in

Shizuoka Prefecture, a part of the main industrial zone along the Pacific coastal line, have provided
a range of services for the Nikkeijin and their families, including the dissemination of newsletters
containing useful information, the assignment of Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking staff in the town
hall, and the provision of language classes.169 Spurred on by calls from the local institutions,
particularly medical and educational ones, some local governments have also adopted various
support measures to tackle the issues generated through the social integration of foreign workers.
By applying the 1899 Sick-Travelers Treatment Law, local authorities, such as the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government, Saitama and Kanagawa Prefectures, have made efforts to cover rapidly
accumulated unpaid fees owned by foreigners.170 In terms of the education problem, the Kanagawa
Prefectural Office launched a system to subsidize municipalities in employing and dispatching
teachers for Japanese language training for foreign children.171 Creating a striking contrast with
Japan’s official anti-immigration positions,172 such remedies by local governments have been
considered significant achievements to deal with the social costs created by the foreign worker
residents.

Yet, the contributions of local governments are restrained in two senses: their

approaches are still largely derived from the predominantly economic consideration of foreign
workers merely as a complementary labor to the local industries, and they are reactionary and ad
hoc responses to the urgently growing demands rather than comprehensive long-term plans for the
further deepening incorporation of foreign migrant workers in Japanese society.
The growing awareness of foreign worker exploitation has led to the foundations of myriad
support groups voluntarily initiated by Japanese citizens, which have endeavored to protect rights of
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foreign workers and to enthusiastically involve in Japan’s politics of migration as “new” social
forces by developing critiques toward the racialized attitudes of the Japanese state and society.
While some progressive unions, such as Zentoitsu, have been actively organizing foreign workers,
“Bright,” the first foreign immigrant workers’ labor union was formed in Tokyo by Japanese
volunteers in March 1993 to help foreign laborers to escape inhuman treatments with impunity.173
Some representative NGOs, such as Kalabaw no Kai in Yokohama, ALS no Kai in Nagoya, and
CALL Network in Tokyo, have been actively assisting foreigners in various ways, ranging from
legal counsel to language training.174 As for the development of these organized attempts in civil
society to provide support for foreign workers, Tadashi Yamamoto explains:
The government’s failure to respond effectively to the vast social changes and
the pluralization of social values brought about by the forces of globalization
and the intensification of interdependence, on the one hand, and a growing
interest on the part of citizens in responding to the widening space of social
needs, on the other, resulted in the emergence of civil society in Japan.175
In the same line, Komai argues that these NGOs “should be given rights and institutional status as
organizations able to represent the interests of foreign workers.”176 From these perspectives, the
active participations of the integrated citizens in the political realm are highlighted as the driving
force for the transformation of the institutional and conceptual framework of exclusionist national
sovereignty based on rapidly growing transnational relations in civil society, which Yoshikazu
Sakamoto calls the realization of the “civic state.”177
However, this optimistic perspective on the role of NGOs in the politics of migration
undermines the important problem inherent to these organizations’ operations.

Koichi Ogawa et

al.’s study of Kanagawa City Union (KCU), a trade union run by the Japanese and organizing 630
foreign workers by spring 2000, concludes that “we can hardly say that the union is cultivating the
ability of its foreign membership to realize its rights as workers by forming solidarity relations at
work and expanding their autonomy by organizing other workers themselves.”178 As they elucidate,
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foreign members are not active subjects but rather passively mobilized participants in their own
movement; in other words, they are basically recipients of union services to resolve their troubles.
In this sense, the hardest task that these support groups need to overcome is not only how to make
their organizational structure more democratic for the foreign members but also how to contribute
for consciousness raising, education, and self-directed action among foreign workers themselves.
That is, the accommodations made by local governments and NGOs as “new” social forces in the
politics of migration have helped to improve the incorporation mechanisms of foreign workers in
Japanese society, but as a foreign participant in the National Migrant Worker Forum asserts,
“organizing does not equal just getting foreign workers into union, nor is it providing information in
their native languages, which is only one step toward solving their problems working and living in
Japan.”179
Thus, the involvement of these “new” social forces in the politics of migration has
challenged the racially exclusive immigration policies of the Japanese state and the prevailing
practices of racial discrimination in its society, but their attempts have not sufficiently empowered
foreign workers themselves to overcome their disadvantaged conditions.

Yet, reflecting the

prolonged stay of foreign workers in Japan, the current absence of self-organized resistance
movements of foreign migrant workers does not indicate that Japan’s discriminatory attitudes can be
maintained without generating social chaos in the future between the Japanese who assert the social
and cultural antagonisms against foreigners and immigrants and their succeeding generations who
are militantly mobilized toward their racialized acceptance in the country.

This point is

underscored by the recent mobilization of the politically and socio-economically marginalized
Korean residents in Osaka, especially led by those of second and third generation, to demand equal
political representation through obtaining the voting right in local elections.

That is, as the

Japanese economy has structurally deepened its dependence on foreign labor within the context of
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the contemporary restructuring of the global political economy, further substantial changes in
Japanese political and social realm are necessary to effectively carry out its “unavoidable task,” that
is, the integration of the “Others.” For Japan, as Miyajima suggests by referring to C. Wihtol de
Wenden, “the question which needs to be addressed is that immigrants have for some time formed a
structural part of this society, necessitating a redefinition of the political and social participation of
immigrants in the country in which they live.”180 In this respect, Japan needs to implement “double
democratization” in political and social spheres by developing the sense of multiculturalism.
On the one hand, it is significant for the Japanese central government from the long-term
perspective to carry out institutional democratization, that is, the establishment of legal and formal
equality between domestic and foreign populations in the country by altering its racially exclusive
immigration policies, which have not only facilitated the institutionalized and societal racialization
against foreign workers but also forcefully and automatically imposed the disadvantaged conditions
on them.

For this purpose, it is most difficult to rethink the form and content of citizenship in

Japan and to decouple it from the historically constructed notions of culturally and ethnically
homogenous Japanese nation.

Furthermore, to avoid the chaotic social segregation by constructing

a permanent underclass of migrants and their following generations, the long-term plans of the
educational provision for foreign children needs to be carefully considered.
The norm of racialization is deeply embedded into Japanese society.
Japanese civil society also needs to be democratized.

In this respect,

The democratization of civil society involves

the creation of culturally tolerant public space for the participation of foreigners.

The rapidly

intensified inflows of foreign labor migrants in Japan and their deepening involvement in Japanese
society dialectically related to the dramatic restructuring of global political economy has forced
Japan to reconsider its self-perception of nation-state and national society as culturally and racially
homogeneous entities.

A hard challenge that Japan has encountered within the context of

49

contemporary globalization, exemplified by the impact of dynamics of foreign labor migration on
the Japanese society, is the necessary transformation of each individual’s discernment of the self and
“Others”—the reinvention of individual identity by going beyond the myth of homogeneity—to
integrate foreign workers as new citizens of the country.

In the face of the dramatically globalizing

contemporary world, it is the tolerance for multicultural coexistence based on the sense of equality
that a truly “internationalized” Japan needs to genuinely create within the space of its civil society.

IV. Conclusion
In the contemporary globalization period, dramatically intensified foreign labor migration
into Japan calls into question the Japanese modern nation-state and national society founded upon
the myth of ethnic and cultural homogeneity.

The idea of the nation-state as a racial unity, which

has historically constructed and rehabilitated throughout Japan’s modernization, continues to
function as the key basis of the Japan’ predominant ideology and its relation to the world by
considering the incorporation of the “Other” as a threat to the cohesion of the society.

Based on

this belief, the Japanese state has strictly regulated the entry of foreign workers into the country.
Yet, since the mid-1980s, along with Japan’s accelerating involvement in economic globalization
and its internal socio-demographic changes, foreign workers have flowed rapidly into Japan to fill
the shortage of labor, particularly the acute scarcity of low-paid manual workers.

Consequently,

foreign unskilled workers have begun to play indispensable roles in supporting Japanese economy
from the bottom.
In this context, as a response to the restructuring of global economy, the Japanese state’s
1990 revision of immigration policies manifested the internationalization and renationalization of
the state.

Restrictive regulations for foreign unskilled immigration, largely driven by racialized

consideration, maintained throughout the revision.

Nevertheless, the ad hoc reactions to the

Japan’s acute demands for cheap foreign labor have promoted massive inflows of legal and illegal
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foreign manual workers, which have deterritorialized and fundamentally challenged the form of
Japan’s modern nation-state.

The presences of the Nikkeijin through the legalization of their status

and their discriminatory acceptance in the society have made the meaning of Japanese identity
ambiguous.

The odd situation with the presence of highly stratified foreign labor market

depending on legitimacy and ethnicity within a supposedly classless society has also raised the very
question of social structure in Japan.

The presence of foreign labor migrants has brought to light

issues of class and ethnicity for the first time in Japan by problematizing the Japanese
self-understanding of itself as a monoethnic society.
As “temporary laborers” increasingly become transformed into “social beings” in Japanese
society, foreign immigrant workers must cope with severe discrimination.

Despite the prevailing

practices of institutionalized and societal-based racialization against foreigners, there is no
noticeable self-mobilized resistance movement by immigrants largely because of the fragmentation
of their immigrant communities.

“New” social forces, such as local governments and NGOs, have

been actively involved in the politics of migration not only to improve the material conditions of
foreign residents but also to challenge the racially exclusive state policies.

Yet, these social forces’

achievement in raising class consciousness among the immigrants to counter the discriminatory
perceptions and practices received from Japanese society has still been limited.

Reflecting the

proclivity of increasing “settlement” of foreign workers, to prevent the friction arising between
locals and immigrant workers as well as their successor generations from creating chaotic situations,
Japan needs to achieve a “double democratization” at institutional and societal levels.

Through

this process, the creations of formal equality for foreign residents and of cultural tolerance in social
space are significant.

With the intensification of foreign labor immigration in contemporary

globalization, the greatest challenge that Japan has faced is how to wipe out the long-believed myth
of homogeneity through the transformation at the grass-roots level for the “unavoidable task,” that is,
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to incorporate culturally or ethnically different “Others” as new members of the Japanese society.
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